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Abstract * 
A new form of adaptation research and policy within the field of climate change is being 
shaped by ideas that are borrowed from established international development discourses. 
This paper addresses some ofthe key issues arising from the use of sociological 
methodologies in this new international development arena. An overview of the science of 
climate change and language of adaptation forms the basis for an analysis of the 
application of adaptation policy in practice. Discourses of disaster and ecological crisis as 
they are expressed in international policy are examined in a critical light. I suggest the use 
of ernie perspectives to complement the context provided by a world historical political 
economy. Alternative methods and concepts from the social sciences that might be useful 
in reframing the paradigm are explored with a view to adaing depth and context to 
adaptation research. 
Keywords: climate change, adaptation, discourse analysis, social science 
Introduction: the culture of climate 
We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we 
notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted. 
- Baier, 1986. 
Scientists are trying to understand how and why the world's climate systems are changing. 
Out of this research has emerged the need to adapt to these changes. This has given rise to 
the new policy and research field of adaptation which borrows from existing paradigms of 
development, disaster mitigation, and livelihoods aSl)essrnents. In doing this, adaptation 
also inherits the shortcomings of these paradigms, not to mention the question of the 
appropriateness of some of the concepts and methods employed. 
There is an apparent split between climate change scientists, policy makers and 
development practitioners on the one hand, and anthropologists/sociologists/human 
geographers on the other. It is clear that different discourses and methodological practices 
are founded on different epistemological and ontological trajectories. Along another axis, 
development practitioners and climate change policy makers have found a common 
language in mitigation, vulnerability, adaptation and disaster management, which pits 
them against scientists, both social and physical, who have methodological concerns about 
the application of their science. 
This paper aims to tease out and unpack the different value positions that inhere in the 
range of discourses and methods that currently permeate the field of climate change. In 
doing so, I will examine the underlying concepts, methods and their application by various 
actors and institutions. The phenomenon of ideas moving from academics in fringe 
* The fmandal assistance of the National Research Foundation toward this research is hereby 
acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and not necessarily to 
be attributed to the National Research Foundation. I am grateful to Sue Parnell for her supervision, Donna 
Podems, Colleen Crawford and Ben Cousins for editorial support, and Gina Ziervoge1, Harald Winkler and 
Steve Thome for their insights into climate change. 
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institutions to centre-stage in the 'development industry,1 is well noted. Classic examples 
are Robert Chambers' popularisation of participatory and 'rapid' methods, and Ian 
Scoones' articulation of the livelihoods analysis. In development discourse, which 
includes 'climate speak', it seems that notions of culture, power and difference, have been 
given inadequate attention. At the same time, disciplines such as anthropology and post-
colonial studies are constantly advancing critical theory regarding these issues. Is it that in 
the translation between thick description and programme implementation, there is no 
traction for the kind of language that 'cultural analysis' uses? 
This paper will show how adaptation has evolved in the climate change debate. It is 
intended for social scientists who have had little exposure to the climate change debate, as 
well as climate scientists and policy makers who have had little exposure to theoretical 
and methodological issues in the social sciences. It will review how various institutions 
have applied these ideas in their adaptation policy approaches before exploring other 
paradigmatic approaches to the issue that the social sciences may offer. I argue that the 
meaningful application of sociological methods and concerns in the climate policy debate 
would enrich the application of climate change research. 
I take as my first thesis that climate change and adaptation debates constitute a new 
"cultural politics of nature" (Gregory, 1994: 80). Following Gregory's example in "being 
suspicious of any discourse that gathers to itself privileges and closures that sustain a 
supremely self-confident claim to a singular and universal 'truth' independent of subject 
position" (ibid), I aim to situate the 'knowledges' that infonn the use of the social sciences 
in the context of climate change adaptation.2 . 
My second thesis asserts that the discourse that allows the nascent field of climate change 
to talk about earth and its people in a particular way is worth examining. In this sense, 
there is a social theory (or theories) that underlies climate change adaptation work. To 
examine this newly fonning body oftheory is to draw attention to the embeddedness of 
intellectual inquiry in social life: to the contexts and casements that shape our local 
knowledges, however imperiously global their claims to know, and to the practical 
consequences of understanding (and being in) the world like this rather than like that 
(Gregory, 1994). To this end, I ask the question: how is the art and science of 
representation being conducted within development and climate change debates today? A 
useful starting point might be the consideration of political economy, as an interest in the 
mutual detennination of political processes and economic activity in a historically viewed 
system of nation states. Such a line of inquiry provides perspective on how climate change 
discourses are growing and finding strength in development discourses. 
Climate change science and adaptation policy 
The climate change arena is composed of a scientific community that is working on 
understanding the complex dynamics between the earth's atmosphere and climate, a 
I Development industry refers to governments, international agencies and other actors who determine the 
nature and direction of significant resource flows from both 'North'to 'South' and 'South' to 'North'. 
2 See Haraway, 1991, for discussion on the situated nature of knowledge in the context of new technologies 
for the production of knowledge. 
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policy community that is attempting to establish a global regulatory framework, social 
scientists concerned with the human dimensions of global environmental change, and 
development practitioners aware of the impacts of physical, political and economic 
changes that global warming might have on the beneficiaries of development projects. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the World 
Meteorological Organisation and United Nations Envirofu"Uent Programme (UNEP) in 
1988 to assess scientific, technical and socioeconomic information that is relevant in 
understanding human-induced climate change, its potential impacts, and options for 
mitigation and adaptation. The IPCC is currently organized into three working groups: 
Working Group I (WGI) addresses observed and projected changes in climate; Working 
Group II (WGII) addresses vulnerability, impacts and adaptation related to climate 
change; and Working Group III (WGIII) addresses options for mitigation of climate 
change (IPCC, 2001a). 
In 2001, the !PCC issued its Third Assessment Report (TAR), the scope of which was to 
assess the vulnerability of ecological systems, socioeconomic sectors and human health to 
climate change, as well as potential impacts of climate change, positive and negative, on 
these systems. It also examines the feasibility of 
adaptation to enhance the positive effects of 
climate change and ameliorate negative effects 
(!PCC, 2001a, b). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was adopted on 9 May 1992, in 
New York, and signed at the 1992 Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro by more than 150 countries and 
the European Community. Its ultimate objective is 
the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system." It contains commitments for all 
Parties, particularly countries listed under Annex I, 
whose aim is to return greenhouse gas emissions 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (which 
targeted ozone depleting gasses) to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000. The Convention entered in force in 
March 19943• 
Of particular note in the Convention is the writing 
into international law of distinctions between 
'developed' and 'developing' countries. 
Ostensibly, this distinction is based on historical 
levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
underpinning the environmental justice principle 
of Polluter Pays. It has serious implications for 
countries party to the convention, in the form of 
penalties if emissions reduction commitments are 
3 See www.unfccc.int. 
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Box I: Overview of Climate Change 
In 2003 it is widely agreed by the scientific 
community that rapid climate change is 
occurring. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
IPCC (2001 a), the rate and duration of 
warming observed during the twentieth 
century are unprecedented for the past 
thousand years. Since the end of the 
nineteenth century, the global average 
surface temperature has increased by about 
0.6 °C, with the 1990s likely being the 
warmest decade in the instrumental record 
since 1861. Increases in maximum 
temperatures, numbers of hot days, and the 
heat index have been observed over nearly all 
lands during the second half of the twentieth 
century (IPCC 200Ia). The observed 
warming over the past fifty years can be 
mostly attributed to human activities (i.e., the 
human-induced changes in atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations and aerosols). 
The warming trend in the global average 
surface temperature is expected to continue, 
with increases projected to be in the range of 
1.4 to 5.8°C by 2\00 in comparison to 1990. 
There is increasing observational evidence 
that regional changes in climate have 
contributed to various changes in physical 
and biological systems in many parts of the 
world. Physical and biological changes 
include the shrinkage of glaciers, thawing of 
permafrost, changes in rainfall frequency and 
intensity, shifts in the growing season, early 
flowering of trees and emergence of insects, 
and shifts in the distribution ranges of plants 
and animals in response to changes in 
climatic conditions (IPCC 2001 a, b). 
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not reached (for Annex I countries), or because in the fulfilment of commitments, 
developing countries might receive considerable resources. 
It is necessary at this point to make brief mention of the politics of international 
development. While the language of 'developed/developing' implies 'gaps' in areas such 
as infrastructure, Gross Domestic Product (GOP), and health, the underlying politics are 
rooted in colonialism and conquest. The alliance of 'developing' countries points to the 
fact that it is a political, if not always geographical, 'North/South' that exists. In forcing 
this political reality to consciousness, there are methodological repercussions for inquiry 
into social processes. This debate between etie versus ernie perspectives is further 
discussed below. 
The political and economic repercussions of the distinction between 'developed' and 
'developing' finds concrete expression in the Kyoto Protocol, made infamous by the 
withdrawal of the United States of America. The Protocol was adopted at the Third 
Session of the Conference ofthe Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997, in Kyoto, Japan. It 
contains legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. 
Countries included in ~ex B of the Protocol (which corresponds with the countries 
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC) agreed to reduce their anthropogenic GHG emissions 
(C02, CH4, N20, HFCs, PFCs, and SF64) by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012. The Kyoto Protocol has not yet entered into force (as of 
February 2003) (UN, 2002). 
The Kyoto Protocol initiated the establishment of the so-called 'flexibility mechanisms' 
that would allow developed countries to meet their 'emissions quotas'. This carbon-
trading scheme is a market-based mechanism. It is the trade in these credits between 
countries that will detennine their price. The aim of the 'flexibility mechanisms' is to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases that have been identified as harmful to the earth's 
atmosphere. 
In the climate change arena all parties continually make reference to the text of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Each reference re-Iegitimates the 
convention while establishing the claimant's bone fides. As a 'framework' agreement 
between 150 countries in 1992, it was originally broad and vague, and thus requires 
constant fleshing out, interpretation, additional agreements, protocols, accords and the like 
(Glazewski, 2001; Glantz, 2003). On one level, it re-articulates national identities through 
United Nations' discursive practices. At other levels, it represents the continued battle 
between states and their 'civil society' constituencies, and the opening of public arenas to 
corporate interests. It also represents a new field of research that is tightly circumscribed 
by global policy, a governing body, and small set of ex pelts, all of which have a particular 
politics, history, and moral trajectory. 
The climate change debate is concerned with two distinct projects: mitigation and 
adaptation. The initial thrust of the agreements that gave birth to the UNFCCC was on 
action that would reduce dangerous interference with the climate system by the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, commonly called 
mitigation. The second project is the reduction of vulnerability by the process of 
4 Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydro fluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexa-fluoride, 
respectively. 
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'adaptation'. The evolution of adaptation research is a much more recent phenomenon, 
chronicled by Burton et al. (2002). Its growth from being handmaiden to impacts research 
in the mitigation context to its present emergence in a role crucial to the development of 
adaptation policy is recent and rapid, such that the field is quite open to a range of 
possibilities and influences. 
GHG emissions trading is possible because GHGs are thoroughly mixed in the atmosphere 
- so it does not matter where emissions are reduced or produced. However, adaptation 
requires a totally different framework because each place is affected differently; every 
geographic locale needs its own specific response, because its geology, weather, economy, 
and culture tum that space into place (cf. Benko and Strohmayer, 1997). Burton et al. 
(2002) identify a shift in policy thinking from the question of gross and net impacts to 
questions about vulnerability, and how and where to deploy adaptation responses. 
Adaptation is currently defined as "adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities" (IPCC, 2001: 72). How this is interpreted and applied tends to 
vary, and the language employed in its application is revealing and deserving of further 
critical attention. The World Bank's use of the concept includes "all those responses to 
climatic conditions that may be used to reduce vulnerability" (2002: 16). Alternatively, for 
some social scientists, "adaptation is a process by which strategies to moderate, cope or 
even take advantage of the consequences of climate events are enhanced, developed and 
implemented. Adaptation occurs through decisions made between individuals, groups and 
organizations and their networks" (Conde and Lonsdale, Technical Paper 2, forthcoming: 
1). 
The UNFCCC states its ultimate objective as being "the prevention of dangerous 
interference" (Article 2). Scientific understanding of the probable net impacts of climate 
change informs policy makers as to the level of urgency required in the political climate 
change negotiations, and also the targets and schedules that need to be adopted if 
'dangerous interference' is to be avoided. Most research about adaptation as reported by 
the IPCC has been carried out in this "impacts and mitigation" context, and this is 
reflected strongly in the methodology employed (Burton et al., 2002). Its central concern 
is mitigation: the greater the impacts, the more need for mitigation; by implication, the 
greater the effectiveness of adaptation in reducing vulnerability to climate change, the less 
the urgency to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses. 
Adaptation arises in the Framework Convention in another way: 'developed' countries 
party to the IJNFCCC have committed to "assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects (UNFCCC, Article 4.4). In this context, the emphasis 
shifts from questions of impact to vulnerability, and how and where to deploy adaptation 
responses. It is to the advantage of each 'developing' country, then, to show how 
vulnerable it is to climate change, because they are essentially in competition with each 
other for increasingly scarce donor funds that allow developed countries to meet their 
UNFCCC commitments. 
While there are two directions and purposes in adaptation research (for mitigation policy 
and for adaptation policy), most research has been conducted in response to the mitigation 
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issue. Burton et al (2002) explain this by the predominance given to mitigation over 
adaptation in the text of the UNFCCC itself and in the negotiations leading up to the initial 
signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. However, a new type of adaptation research was 
called for at the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) to the UNFCCC, and reinforced 
at COP-7 in Marrakech, where more attention was given to matters of adaptation, and 
three funds were identified as being necessary, each with an adaptation component. 
Burton et al. (2002) describe the gulf that has arisen between what they call 'first 
generation adaptation research', with its impacts and mitigation orientation, and a 'second 
generation' of adaptation research that is now beginning, which meets the needs of 
adaptation policy in its own right. This literature is most impressive in the identification 
and assessment of biophysical impacts. It is less developed and less convincing in the 
identification of socio-economic impacts, in part because less attention is given to socio-
economic changes than to climate changes (Burton ct al., 2002: 152). 
Two key concepts to have emerged out of this new approach to adaptation are adaptive 
capacity and its flip side, vulnerability. The UNFCCC defines adaptive capacity as "the 
ability of a system to adjust to climate change, including climate variability and extremes, 
to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities or to cope with the 
consequences". This has been qualified and explored further so that it is now seen as a 
function of wealth; population characteristics such as demographic structure, education 
and health; organizational arrangements and institutions; and access to technology and 
equity, to name a few of the variables (Burton et aI., 2002). Others define it as the ability 
of a society to reduce vulnerability, determined not only by the likely responses to climate 
change of resources such as water, soil and biodiversity on which individuals depend, but 
by the availability of resources and by the entitlement of individuals and groups to call on 
these resources (Adger et al., forthcoming, TP7: 1). 
Vulnerability has only recently emerged as a key concept in second generation adaptation 
studies. It has been described as a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate 
change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive 
capacity. The UNFCCC further defines vulnerability as the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including 
variability and extremes (IPCC, 2001 b). 
It is important to note how the scientism of the language leads one to imagine that the 
vulnerability of a livelihood system could have a number attached to it. Attaching a 
numerical value to what is essentially qualitative data underpins the belief that only what 
can be numerically measured can be managed. The livelihoods framework relies on an 
economic view of people's assets that underlie their livelihood strategies, and thus has 
serious implications for method and analysis. The key concepts of climate change and 
adaptation rely on a particular language of assets and vulnerability, which is explored 
below. 
The language of trust and certainty 
In examining the language of climate change a persistent need for comparability emerges. 
The implications of this for the social sciences are subtle: what of the power of language 
in constructing a story about a unique place and people? In a sense, the whole of the IPCC 
enterprise is aimed at assuring trust and comparability in the science, in the interests of 
6 
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mobilising mitigation action on a global scale (Burton et al., 2002). Khan writes 
eloquently about the nature of a certifying agency that everyone can trust, and the costs 
involved in such a production of trust (Khan, 2002). "Trust, as economists have noted 
before, is a public good, a social lubricant which makes possible production and 
exchange" (Dasgupta, 1988, p. 64, in Khan, 2002: 1725). In the economy of knowledge 
within which climate change discourses exist, it is deserving of further critical analysis. 
Might the IPCC might rely on an individual pursuit of private vice (in the interface 
between flexibility mechanisms, mitigation and adaptation research, and national and 
corporate interests) for its commodification of trust to work in the interests of the public 
good? To complete Dasgupta's quote, 
The point is that if your trust in me increases it certainly benefits me. But if there 
are good reasons for this increase in trust, it benefits you as well. The latter benefit 
I do not take into account when I try to build up my own reputation. This is the 
source of 'market failure' and, in particular, why there might typically be an under-
investment in trust formation (Dasgupta, 1988, p. 64, in Khan, 2002: 1725). 
In other words in order to transact the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
UNFCCC, there has to be trust in the claims to truth generated in climate change and 
adaptation research. The relevance of this logic to the climate change negotiations is 
demonstrated in the context of adaptation research and the nature of the whole project of 
the production of scientific knowledge. In understanding how language/discourse works to 
produce trust in climate change science, it is necessary to understand how the science 
deals discursively with certainty and truth. 
Uncertainty 
The climate change arena is filled with uncertainty - but then again, it is also filled with 
atmospheric scientists, whose science is still very uncertain. While the climate systems 
analysts have a hard enough time understanding current climate patterns and past events, 
the emphasis has been on future climate, because of the political nature ofthe climate 
change negotiations. The Third Assessment Report (TAR) acknowledges that many of the 
conclusions reached are "subject to various degrees of uncertainty" (IPCC, 2001b: 79). A 
Bayesian probability framework has been used to assess and report "confidence levels", so 
that we are to understand that "the probability ofan event is the degree of belief that exists 
among lead authors and reviewers that the event will occur, given observations, modelling 
results, and theory currently available" (ibid). To this end, a five-point quantitative 
probability scale has been developed, ranging from "very high confidence" (95% or 
greater) to "very low confidence" (5% or less) (ibid: 80). 
For some conclusions, the 5-point quantitative scale is not appropriate as a 
characterization of 'associated uncertainty'. In these instances, TAR authors qualitatively 
evaluated the level of scientific understanding in support of a conclusion, based on the 
amount of supporting evidence and the level of agreement among experts about the 
interpretation of the evidence. The qualitative "state of knowledge descriptors" range from 
''well established", "established but incompleteH , "competing explanation", to 
"speculative" (ibid). Of importance here is the language of certainty, the effects that it has 
on our sense of trust in the science, and the social nature of arriving at certainty. 
7 
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The impact and vulnerability studies that form the b3Sis of the TAR are based on a range 
of climate scenarios. The future-orientation of the whole field, and its predictive 
assumptions, are carried through to "socioeconomic" concerns. The IPee acknowledges 
this to some degree: "[gJreat care is required in interpreting and comparing results from 
research or assessments that use different climate scenarios, particularly when some 
conclusions follow from static scenarios and others from transient scenarios. 
Unfortunately, such mixed use of scenarios is still a problem in the literature and in 
assessments of it" (ibid: 95). 
Socioeconomic uncertainty 
In addressing the uncertainties inherent in forecasting social conditions, the TAR 
acknowledges some of the problems inherent in such a methodology. A large source of 
uncertainty in assessments of impacts and vu1nerability is the wide difference in 
assumptions (often not even stated) in the initial conditions and trends of environmental 
systems and 'socioeconomic conditions'. These assumptions include information on 
population and related variables (for example popUlation density), economic trends 
(income levels, sectoral composition ofGDP, and levels of trade), other social indicators 
(education levels, private- and public-sector institutions), culture, land cover and use, and 
availability and use of other resources such as water (IPee, 2001b: 95). What this kind of 
positivist paradigm finds difficult to include in its assessments is the structural questions 
of political economy and their related methodological difficulties with scale. However, 
these 'variables' are important not only for determining the forces driving global changes 
but also for understanding the general capabilities available to societies for adaptation. 
Projections of these factors for time periods such as the middle of the 21st century are at 
least as uncertain as projections of future climate. Moreover, as the TAR acknowledges in 
its discussion on uncertainty, 'culture' exerts important influences on socio-economic 
processes and problem-solving methods (IPee, 2001b: 96). The formation of coalitions, 
social movements, and educational programs directed toward changing institutional norms 
that might influence people's behaviour concerning climatic change is 'culturally' 
determined, like other complex social and psychological processes. It is important to note 
that the IPee approach is impacts driven, rather than vulnerability driven, and this is 
reflected in the approach to "first generation" or Type 1 impacts and adaptation research 
design (Burton et ai, 2002: 151). 
The language of socio-economic scenario building is not able to encompass the 
complexity of layering of meanings and power plays, shifting structural forces and the 
subtleties of identity politics as they find expression through relationships between people. 
This is implied in the references to the conditioning and determining role of 'culture' in 
various social processes. The language of socia-economic scenario building deserves more 
critical attention. 
The Adaptation Policy Framework and the Technical Paper Series 
The Adaptation Policy Framework is an initiative funded by the GEF, EU, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland, although institutionally it is situated within the IPee, which itself 
8 
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is supported by people from various global organisations, such as UNDP. (The APF's lead 
co·ordinator, Bo Lim, works for UNDP • see Box 2). It is complemented by a Technical 
Paper (TP) Series that covers a range of issues, and is noteworthy for the tone and timbre 
of its discourse: expert, assured and evidently deeply concerned with the situation of 
impoverished rural subsistence farmers of the Least Developed Countries for whom 
National Adaptation Plans of Action are 'challenging'. It is a 'how to' series that borrows 
from development practice, and its project is to establish a common system, or a uniform 
approach that, on a good day, would allow for approaches and projects to be coordinated 
and harmonized, and on a bad day, would force projects to conform to a template and 
discourse that is constrictive, jargonised, and inappropriate5• 
It is worth noting that the Adaptation Policy Framework is being established and written 
into policy by atmospheric scientists, ecologists, meteorologists, hydrologists, 
geophysicists, biologists, and economists. There is not a dedicated social scientist among 
the group that met in Montreal, 2001, to set this framework in motion. (UNDP-GEF 
Report, 2001). 
The series outlines an approach that is 
set to become orthodoxy and widely 
used. It includes how to "scope, design 
and implement specific projects for 
developing adaptation strategies, 
policies and measures to reduce the 
potential negative impacts and exploit 
the opportunities of climate variability 
and change, and to enhance capacity to 
adapt" (TP 1, forthcoming) to 
"establishing a framework for 
monitoring adaptation strategies that are 
actually implemented in order that the 
results can be evaluated" (TP9, 
forthcoming). 
There are a range of key ideas that 
underpin this 'technical' set of texts. 
Notable is the concept of 'stakeholder', 
which neatly brings a range of 
differently powerful individuals and 
institutions onto one plane and imagines 
an 'equitable' decision-making process 
in which all are empowered as solutions 
Box 2: Background to the APF: 
For devdoping countries, a key difficulty in 
vulnerability and adaptation assessments has 
been the integration of adaptation into 
sustainable development plans, and linking 
longer-term climate change to current 
problems caused by climate variability. Most 
National Communications completed to date 
have been more successful in the analysis of 
impacts than in their treatment of adaptation 
options, which has rarely gone beyond the 
preparation of lists of possible measures. In 
response to countries' requests, the National 
Communications Support Programme 
(NCSP) initiated a project to develop an 
Adaptation Policy Framework. This 
framework will be used as a basis for 
building capacity to design studies for 
prioritising adaptation policies and measures 
in the context of national sustainable 
development (UNDP-GEF Report, 2001). 
are worked out jointly. 'Stakeholder' refers to "policy makers, scientists, administrators, 
managers in the economic sectors most at risk~ including both public and private 
5 The APF is still in its infancy, and the Technical Papers are not open for citation, as they are still in the 
process of becoming trustworthy and quotable texts, that is, processed by institutions that produce trust, to 
borrow from Khan (2002). However, I consciously transgress this rule: this paper is in part a response or 
review, and the material is so fresh and will have such an impact on the field that it warrants examination 
now. I treat them at as exclusively the view of their lead authors, and not of the institutions they represent. 
They are also publicly available on the web at www.undp.org/cc/apf outline.htrn. 
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enterprises and community members, who will act together to develop a joint 
understanding of the issue and create solutions to preserve and enhance their adaptive 
capacity" (Conde and Lonsdale, TP2, forthcoming: 1). 
Chambers' insight into the 'professional realities' of development practitioners illuminates 
the difficult fact that different modes of professional engagement allow for different 
discourses and different political projects (Chambers, 1997). The imagined 'community' 
and 'concerned stakeholder' are thus given a rebirth in the climate change discourse. In 
the context of 'involving stakeholders', the schema Lhat has given planners a grasp on 
social processes (as well as headaches when it doesn't seem to fit) that was originally 
articulated by Arnstein in her "ladder of participation" is given a new breath of life in the 
climate change debate. Pretty's Typology of Community Participation (1994) has been 
adapted, and ranges from "passive participation", through giving information, 
consultation, functional participation, interactive participation, self-mobilisation, to 
"catalysing change", the holy grail of community participation (cf. Guijt and Shah, 1998). 
The normative programming of such language leaves implicit the realities of differences 
in power and structural relationships of inequality. Because the texts are hortative, they 
make assumptions about the social structuring ofthe world and leave little room for a 
critical analysis that could inform any interruptive action. This normative language is built 
on notions of 'community' and the 'local'. Local capacity, local needs, local people, and 
local problems, are all built on a notion of scale that, while radically relative, is imbued 
with a scope of political action, and a set of assumptions and values, that most of the time 
goes unquestioned. 
"More in-depth projects aimed at preventing or ameliorating climate impacts and risks" 
that are being touted as exemplars of this new generation of Vulnerability and Adaptation 
studies mentioned above apparently have three new aspects: the development of a 
stakeholder or bottom-up approach, and more profound multi-sectoral and socio-economic 
analyses (Conde and Lonsdale, TP2, forthcoming: 10). These three aspects aim to 
support the integration of adaptation into other environmental and development policies 
(Conde and Lonsdale, TP2, forthcoming). 
Conde and Lonsdale (TP2, forthcoming) recognize the importance of getting beyond the 
'usual suspects' of development, and reaching beyond 'local dignitaries', businessmen and 
academics. They imply, but leave absent, a critique of the skewed power relationships that 
are the norm in development projects. How this might be achieved, however, is not 
suggested and thus provides no real confidence that climate change adaptation projects 
will be any different from run-of-the-mill 'development-style projects' in which these 
problematic relationships are born. At the centre of ~uch rdationships lies the question of 
control over information and decision-making power. 
Central to climate change debates is the notion of scenario building. TP2 introduces the 
idea of participatory scenario building, simulation, role-play, visioning, and backcasting, 
as techniques that can be used with stakeholders to construct possible futures. The kinds of 
questions that these methods allow appear to be culturally and ideologically loaded: "what 
if the climate changes but the coping range does not?" (Conde and Lonsdale, TP2, 
forthcoming: 11). What does this say of the 'stakeholders' who might engage in these 
exercises? The techniques suggested do not seem to allow for an analysis of the interstices 
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between climate events: the processes that lead up to and follow events that climate 
models aim to simulate. 
Of particular note for social scientists not familiar with the climate change debate is the 
notion of "socioeconomic conditions and prospects" that is introduced by Malone and La 
Rovere in TP6 (forthcoming). It brings up questions central to human geography, 
anthropology and other social sciences, such as scale and methods of knowledge-
production. It suggests that in characterizing 'socioeconomic' scenarios in terms of 
conditions and prospects, it is taking an innovative approach that is preferable to a 
quantitative and model-based scenario approach. In order to appreciate this innovation, it 
is important to recognize that hitherto for, socioeconomic scenarios have been strictly a 
numbers game (GDP, population, mortality), reliant on Global Circulation Models 
(GCM). They were designed to produce data for emissions and mitigation scenarios for a 
bureaucratic class of advisors to governments. 
In the context of climate change, "the challenge [of characterizing socio-economic 
conditions and prospects] is to relate both present and future climate to changing socio-
economic conditions to increase the realism of the analysis, to identify projected socio-
economic conditions .. .. and to devel9P adaptation strategies appropriate to the societies of 
the future" (my emphasis) (Malone and La Rovere, TP6, forthcoming: 2). While the 
authors claim to be responding to problems of longer timescales and larger spatial 
(national and global) scales by focusing on strategies for characterizing socio-economic 
conditions and prospects in the near term and at sectoral and local scales (ibid), some of 
the issues persist. The language of "characterization", "prospects" and "projections" is 
difficult for the social scientists who already struggle to do careful analyses of the 
particular in historical context, let alone a range of possible futures. A heavily economic 
discourse (of GDP as an indicator of social welfare for instance) and a reliance on proxy 
indicators that would allow researchers to 'get on with the job' of summarising the 
'conditions' pervades the text. It does however provide a small window of opportunity for 
social analyses to shape the policy context. 
Adaptation language applied: from disasters to livelihoods 
Climate change is observed most easily through sudden weather-related disasters, and thus 
research and policy has found a language and a method for responding to these challenges. 
Risk management, which entails the study of natural hazards and their social impacts, has 
become increasingly popular in the last decade due to the boost of the United Nations 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), declared in the 1990s, and 
economic challenges to the insurance industry posed by natural disasters6• Adaptation 
research has adopted the language of disaster because it is able to use a ready-made set of 
concepts, legislation and practice that has had several decades to mature. However, in 
adopting the discourse of disaster uncritically, the opportunity to examine its shortcomings 
and limitations is being overlooked. 
6 A detailed study by Glickman et al (1992) found that between 1945 and 1986, 2.34 million people lost their 
lives to disasters and that 30 disasters and 56 000 deaths occurred on average per year. (Torrence and 
Grattan, 2002: 2). 
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Until recently, there were two separate fields of research. Earth scientists studied physical 
properties of the planet such as volcanoes, earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis, aiming to 
predict their occurrences and likely impact. Social scientists focussed on the short-term 
consequences of disasters and stressed cultural aspects of communities in detennining 
their vulnerability to natural processes and their methods for coping with stress. 
Shimoyama insists that although they may be initiated by natural factors, "disasters are 
social phenomena" (Shimoyama, 2002: 20). ''The required condition for a disaster is the 
existence of victims" (ibid.). As Blaikie et al. put it: 
The 'natural' and the 'human' are so inextricably bound together in almost all 
disaster situations, especially when viewed in an enlarged time and space 
framework, that disasters cannot be understood to be 'natural' in any 
straightforward way (Blaikie et ai, 1994: 6). 
The IUCN and disaster 
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has expressed its concern with the impacts of 
climate change and necessity of adaptation in terms of disaster management. Their 
definition of vulnerability reflects this disaster-oriented approach: 
Vulnerability is defined by the exposure to a hazardous event and by people's 
capacity to anticipate, cope, resist and recover from the impact of the event. 
(IVCN, unpublished: pIO). 
In the 1 990s the economic toll of disasters reached record levels and the countries and 
regions affected have required significant 'outside assistance' (IUCN, unpublished). 
Today more people are affected by disasters than by conflict. The ability to respond to and 
recover from disasters is related to access to finance, security of land tenure, 
diversification of income, and other socio-economic factors (ibid). The IUCN's approach 
thus emphasis the importance of risk reduction investment. Thus, adaptation is necessary 
because people need to strengthen their own resilience and to ensure the security of their 
livelihoods in the face of climate change and climate-related disasters (ibid). 
While the IUCN acknowledges the difficulties of mapping the links between local, 
national, and global scales, it has decided to go with the fashionable notions of poverty 
and vulnerability reduction through a livelihoods based approach. The IUCN Task Force 
has 
acknowledged the need to bring the knowledge base of environmental and social 
policy, disaster management together with climate change adaptation ... they urged 
including a fourth area of competence in this effort: poverty alleviation. They 
noted that promoting sustainable livelihoods in the context of climate change is a 
crucial element of improved adaptive capacity (ibid: 12). 
The IUCN's concern with disaster management seems to lie in better environmental 
management. To reduce vulnerability to climate-related disasters, recommendations 
include improving hazard mapping, and utilizing integrated assessment tools (Risk 
Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and Environmental Impact Assessment) in 
development planning, amongst a range of other technocratic and bureaucratic responses. 
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While 'community empowennent' and small-scale diverse adaptations (rather than large 
scale unifonn projects) and the provision of access to resources for "sustainable 
livelihoods" (ibid: l3) is recommended, it seems rather an afterthought than the main 
thrust of their argument. 
What does the mCN mean by improved environmental management? If it means national 
policies, laws, guidelines, environmental management plans, environmental impact 
assessments, then it is hopelessly out of touch with 'people's everyday lives', The 
language games of 'environmental management', of truth, authority, power and science, 
manoeuvre and manipulate resources and people. What do these discourses mean in a very 
local, concrete, and personalised way? What kind of reality are we constructing in the 
language of' disaster', 'rural', 'urban', or 'environmental management'? Do not all the 
signposts point towards that which we are familiar with, bored with, in despair over: the 
same questions of development that the powerful have quibbled over and to which the 
poor and vulnerable have been subjected for decades? 
Adapting to the effects of climate change has more to do with the ways in which we 
organise ourselves socially and politically than with the natural environment per se. The 
ways in which local realities are shaped by larger social and political forces holds true as 
much as the notion that the success of a particular farmer's crop is dependant on global 
climate patterns and regional weather events. The challenge for the mCN, as they 
themselves have realised, lies in conceptualising the linkages across and between scales: 
from the micro to the macro, from the macro to the micro, and between localities (mCN, 
2001: 12). Quite apart from acknowledging that 'poor people' have always had to contend 
with adverse climate, the mCN needs to go beyond discourses of environmental 
management. While climate systems analysts work at producing higher resolution 
forecasts of climate change from GCMs, so too should social scientists be working at 
making meaningful connections between the local particularities and global processes of 
resources and power. 
An adaptation strategy focussed on disasters has the potential to ignore the more subtle 
effects of climate, which if ignored could be just as insidious and destructive. What 
defines a disaster? For example, if rural subsistence farmers slowly get less and less rain 
over 20 years, at what point does this constitute a disaster? When a city becomes water-
stressed and diverts rivers and build more dams, are not the risks simply displaced to other 
people or ecosystems? (See Roy, 2002, for an eloquent exposition of the tangible political 
forces acting to displace people of the Nannada Valley in India). Chronic vulnerabilities 
always find expression in a range of concrete issues that can be tangibly addressed. 
Whether subsistence farmers are able to stay on the land and continue farming is 
dependant on a range of complex social realities and institutional arrangements, as well as 
blunt political forces (fonnal - local government, service provision - and infonnal-
kinship and reciprocity networks, cultural institutions). This perspective helps to focus a 
key question: how can concerns around climate change help to focus existing development 
priorities, such as government extension and support for small-scale farmers, labour and 
migration issues, HIV/AIDS, land tenure arrangements, urban service provision, national 
and international trade and market forces, in short, all the other non-climate related 
variables? 
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Ecological crisis and rural livelihoods: the World Bank and climate change 
The shift in language from impact assessments, tainted with a technocratic history, to 
livelihoods is possible only by borrowing from the lexicon of biology. While Holling 
defines ecological or ecosystem resilience as the magnitude of disturbance that can be 
experienced before a system moves into a different state (or stability domain) and different 
set of controls (Holling, 1996), social resilience has been defined as the ability of human 
communities to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure, such as 
environmental variability or social, economic or political upheaval (Adger, 2000; Folke, 
2001). 
In attempting to understand drivers of global environmental change, there has been a shift 
from pure environmental and social indicators to a more systemic thinking, which heads in 
the direction of livelihoods approaches. Part of the background to this pressure-state-
response conceptual modelling has been Social Impact Analyses (SIA), borne out of the 
field of Environmental Impact Assessments. Hjort-Af-Ornas (2001: 35) expresses an 
unusual ambition for SIA to include not only impacts but also mobilisation and security; 
not only environment-related elements but also even more central elements such as 
identity and belonging. He hopes to include in such a discourse ideas such as social 
capital, identity, and social networks. This brand of 'sustainable development' talk 
emphasises a "search for initiatives and empowennent instead of passive evaluation of 
assets and their changes. It concerns relations, usually expressed in tenns of power, rather 
than assets or losses, usually expressed in monetary tenns" (ibid: 36). This appears to be 
an attempt to fuse development discourses with other kinds of social analysis. 
The World Bank uses the language oflivelihoods, climate variability, vulnerability, and 
assets. It sums up our apocalyptic fears well in its 2002 report on poverty and climate 
change. Its motivation for concern stems from the fact that climate change is a reality, and 
that adaptation will have to occur, although the scope of adaptation responses is closely 
linked to the degree of mitigation. (This is a neat inversion of the original urge to adapt, 
which was to reduce the extent of necessary mitigation). It recognises that the atmosphere 
is already committed to a certain degree of warming due to the slow response of the 
earth's atmospheric system to past emissions (World Bank, 2002). 
'Developing' countries' economies are often predominantly dependent on sectors (for 
example, forestry, agriculture, fisheries) that are particularly sensitive to environmental 
conditions. High popUlation density; low-lying exposed coastlines; low levels of 
infrastructure; and low economic diversification may further add to a country's 
vulnerability. Climate fluctuations and extremes in the current climate can have serious 
consequences for the livelihoods and economic opportunities ofthe 'poor,7. Climate 
change resulting from the rising atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations is 
superimposed on this existing climatic variability. 
This narrative is built on the notion that there are two types of changes induced by climate 
change. The first is sudden disruptive changes, characterised by changes in the frequencies 
and intensities of extreme events; intensifying ofthe hydrological cycle in the fonn of 
1 The World Bank uses the word 'poor' in a way that is disconnected from particular places or people and 
implies that they are a homogeneous group. 
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more intense precipitation events (and thus loss of nutrients, topsoil, erosion etc); 
increased risk of drought; and exacerbation ofEI Nino events. 
The second is long-term decline, which can be just as pernicious. ~Poor' people are more 
reliant on primary production and have a lower adaptive capacity; poor people's 
livelihood sources are usually narrower and more climate sensitive than those of the 'non-
poor'; many of the 'poor' depend directly on goods and services provided by eco-systems 
and the quality of, and their access to, natural resources; the continuing steady pace of 
environmental degradation and resource depletion contributes to diminishing disaster 
coping capabilities. Climate-induced degradation of ecosystems and natural resources can 
therefore lead to significant increases in poverty and vulnerability (World Bank, 2002: 7). 
In its focus on poverty, the World Bank's recognises that except in non-managed natural 
systems, adaptive capacity is generally socially constructed, in the sense that it is 
conditioned by cultural, religious, and political structures. It is also determined by factors 
such as economic resources and other assets, technology and information and the skills 
needed to use them, infrastructure, and 'stable and effective' institutions. Since most 
'poor' countries and 'poor' people are the least endowed with these attributes their 
vulnerability to climate change is higher (ibid: 9; IPCC, 2001 b). 
"Even among the poor", their 2002 report states, "social vulnerability is differentiated, 
since some groups are more lacking in the financial, social, and political means of 
securing alternative livelihoods less exposed to risk than others" (ibid: 10). The World 
Bank has adopted the livelihoods framework as the basis for their response to poverty 
alleviation, which conditions their language and analysis and which is given new life in 
the context of climate change. 
The narrative of rural poverty in social and ecological crisis is retold in this World Bank 
report. Climate change could be devastating for the livelihoods of the 'rural poor' (World 
Bank, 2002: 10). Water scarcity will be exacerbated; warm seasons will become dryer, 
thus increasing the frequency of droughts and land degradation; crop yields are projected 
to decrease; control of natural pests may become increasingly destabilized; loss of 
landmass in coastal areas may displace populations. There will be an increase in 
temperature-related illnesses and death; increased death and injury from extreme weather 
events such as flooding, landslides and storms; also increased incidence of diseases 
associated with such events. Potential direct and indirect impacts of climate change on 
human health could re-impact poverty by increasing vulnerability and reducing 
opportunities by interfering with education and the ability to work (World Bank, 2002: 
13). 
In addition to the economy-wide effects of climate change, such as decreased agricultural 
output and infrastructure damage or loss, climate change would also put a heavy burden 
on poverty eradication efforts. In addition to indebtedness, HIV/AIDS, food insecurity, 
environmental degradation, the impacts of global trade, conflict, economic decline, 
increasing urban poverty, increasing inequality, and macro-economic shocks, climate 
change provides an additional threat that adds to, interacts with, and can reinforce these 
existing risks, placing additional strains on the livelihoods and coping strategies of the 
poor (ibid: 16). 
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The language of crisis includes Africa in its most extreme form. In addition to the risks 
described above, adaptive capacity in Africa is low due to low GDP per capita, 
widespread poverty, inequitable land distribution and low education levels. There is an 
absence of safety nets, particularly after harvest failures. More than a quarter of the 
population lives within 100km of the coast, and most of Africa's largest cities are along 
coasts vulnerable to sea level rise, coastal erosion, and extreme events. Individual coping 
strategies for desertification are already strained, leading to deepening poverty. 
Dependence on rain-fed agriculture is high (ibid: 7). 
With 37.3 % of people in Africa living in urban areas in 1999, and a growth rate of 4.87%, 
Africa is the continent with the fastest rate of urbanisation. The urban population of 
developing countries is expected to reach 50% in 2020. Of the 23 cities expected to reach 
more than 10 million people by 2015, 19 of them will be in 'developing' countries8• In this 
light, it would seem that the questions of urban poverty in the context of climate change 
are pressing. However, for a range of reasons, many of them discursive (cf. Sen, 2001; 
Chambers, 1997), poor people in the third world are seen to be predominantly rural. The 
implications of this kind of thinking are huge: what methods are available for coming to 
grips with the impacts of climate change on the urban poor? To what extent are urban 
issues around climate change visible in the minds of adaptation specialists? 
The livelihoods approach, which has gained much ground in the last ten years since 
Scoones, Chambers and Conway, and the Institute for Development Studies at Sussex 
University first popularised it, asserts that livelihoods are dependant on assets and 
entitlements. A person or group will seek to deploy the different assets they possess, 
which include human, financial, natural, physical and social assets, to best effect within 
the range of the livelihood choices they possess and command. A livelihood is deemed 
'sustainable' when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain 
and enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining 
the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The rural roots of this paradigm 
have placed its applicability to urban contexts and at larger scales in question, although 
there have been attempts to apply the analysis to urban contexts in a meaningful way (cf. 
Beall and Kanji, 
1999). 
Whilst the 
livelihoods 
framework highlights 
the changing 
combinations of 
modes of livelihood 
in a dynamic and 
historical context, its 
strength lies in its 
careful use. In this 
regard, Murray 
• 'IRNI:8 
.~lY 
I U\IBlilXI)A&1S I 
[FIGURE 1: Livelihoods Framework - from Carney, 1998: 5] 
argues that the model should be supplemented by an adequate understanding of the 
broader processes within which particular household livelihood profiles and choices have 
8 From www.unhabitat.org. 
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their existence. This includes the need to understand intra and inter-household conflicts 
and struggles, as well as inequalities of power and conflicts and interest between 
communities of 'poor' people and local elites or government agencies (Murray 2001). 
In addition, there are two further weaknesses in the framework. First, it is easy to assume 
that the measurement of poverty or the assessment of livelihoods can somehow proceed 
through a sort of simple cumulative enumeration of assets in the "asset pentagon". As 
Murray remarks, even "economic" capital is best conceived of as a social relation between 
people. The same is true of social, human, physical and natural capitals: they only are 
what they are because of the broader relationships, practices, institutional frameworks and 
discursive formations within which they are caught. What may count as "social capital" 
or "human capital" in one context cannot necessarily be so counted in another. For this 
reason even the simplest enumeration of basic household assets needs to go beyond simple 
quantification, and has to involve a detailed qualitative and relational understanding of 
social processes (Du Toit, 2003: 7). 
Second, it is possible for research not to go beyond a vague and general approach to the 
understanding of the issues that are indicated by the rather vague reference to 
"transforming structures and processes" in the Departmeni: for International 
Development's (DFID) diagrammatic representation of the livelihoods framework (see 
figure 1). Forms of analysis and theoretical accounts are needed that can mediate between 
different arenas and levels of social process - that can link, for example, household-level 
micro-analyses with accounts of global, national, regional and sub-regional processes 
(ibid.). 
Exploring the social sciences: sustainability, territory, power and meaning 
To gain some perspective on this recently popular paradigm, it is useful to look at the . 
climate change debate from a range of other disciplines in order to widen the vocabulary 
available to adaptation debates. One way of integrating the environmental question, 
including climate change, into an understanding of spatialised social processes lies within 
a movement that criticizes prevailing paradigms. The disciplinary perspective of the 
regional sciences, for instance, has "remained largely fixed on a certain way of seeing the 
world ... the positivist approach to spatial processes (Bailly and Coffey, 1994 in Acselrad, 
1999: 38). In particular, it has excluded the social dimensions from its universe and has 
treated human beings as inanimate objects rather than as thinking subjects, ignoring itself 
as a "science of the mental representation of space and of the practices that result from 
these representations" (ibid). Whilst the livelihoods framework explicitly aims to highlight 
the importance of human capabilities and agency. in an attempt to provide development 
research with an applied and implementing edge, it has become narrow because it 
overlooks the relational nature of capital. 
For all the concern with local practices and cultures, the climate change policy makers 
would benefit from understanding the principles of inductive analysis. What are the 
indigenous categories that the people, for whom adaptation policy is being made, have 
created to make sense of their world? What are practices that they engage in that can be 
understood only within their worldview? Anthropologists distinguish between emic and 
etic perspectives, the latter referring to the labels and worldview imposed by the 
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researchers. Analysing indigenous practices (ernic) begins by understanding them from the 
perspective of its practitioners, within the indigenous context, in the words of the local 
people, in their language, within their worldview (patton, 2002: 455). 
World historical political economy 
Marcus and Fisher (1986) describe an experimental moment in the human sciences that 
took shape in the 1980s that attempted to take account of world historical political 
economy knowing communities in larger systems. The extent to which adaptation 
discourses are able to situate the relationships that exist between specific people in a 
specific place within a larger political economy needs to be explored if sociological 
analyses of adaptation are to offer meaningful contributions. 
The challenge Marcus and Fisher (1986) describe is how to represent the embedding of 
richly described local cultural worlds in larger impersonal systems of political economy. 
This would not be such a problem if the local cultural unit was portrayed as an isolate with 
outside forces of market and state impinging upon it. What makes representation 
challenging and a focus of experimentation is the perception that the "outside forces" in 
fact are an integral part of the construction and constitution of the "inside", the cultural 
unit itself, and must so be registered, even at the most intimate levels of cultural process. 
An understanding of political and economic processes at the level of facts was in doubt 
(ibid: 76). Bearing in mind that Marcus and Fisher were writing shortly before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the stampede in the 1990s towards a discursively globalized world, 
they suggested that the processes themselves are more complex than the dominant 
paradigms seem able to represent. Thus, the possibility exists for political economy to 
rebuild understandings of macro-level systems from the bottom up. In its most radical 
form, the new political economy is pushed towards the particularistic, toward the 
interpretive and cultural, and finally toward the ethnographic (Marcus and Fisher, 1986: 
80). 
They confront head on the discursive practices that are entailed in acts of representations 
of people and places by writers and social scientists. In order to escape the habit, deeply 
engrained in Western theory, of fixing the states of society and culture as already formed, 
and understood as such, by social actors, they quote Raymond Williams's concept of the 
"structure of feeling". As the main concern of realist writing, it is the "articulation of 
richly described experiences of everyday life with larger systems and subtle expressions of 
ideology" (Marcus and Fisher, 1986: 78). Realist writers - whether fictional or 
ethnographic - should, according to Williams, try to merge their preferences for the 
understanding of their subjects' point of view in circumscribed social settings with the 
difficulties of representing accurately the penetration of larger forces. 
Most local cultures worldwide are products of a history of appropriations, resistances, and 
accommodations. In writing about them, Marcus and Fisher describe the challenge as one 
of resisting the conventions of ethnographic des«ription as a measuring of change against 
some self-contained, homogeneous and largely ahistoric framing ofthe cultural unit. They 
suggest that we view cultural situations as always in flux, in a perpetual historically 
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sensitive state (If resistance and accommodation to broader processes of influence that are 
as much inside as outside the local context. 
Some recent ethnographic writing has reacted to the ahistoric quality of much past 
ethnographic writing by taking the forms and content of indigenous historical 
consciousness as their problem. They juxtapose an indigenous consciousness with the 
dominant form of Western historical narration through which the experience of 'third-
world' peoples has been understood in the West. Thus, the historicized ethnography tries 
not only to correct its own ahistoric past, but is also a critique of the way Western 
scholarship has assimilated the 'timeless' cultures of the world (Marcus and Fisher, 1986: 
78). 
An ability to suspend paradigms for the sake of free play with concepts and methods, to 
give attention to micro-processes without denying the importance of some vision oflarger 
world-historical trends is what is needed to give weight and meaning to representations of 
people in the climate policy talk. 
A landmark example of this kind of research is Paul Willis' Learning to Labour (1977), a 
British study of the schooling of working-class males and their preparation for labour in 
industrial production. He argues that impersonal processes that organize modem societies 
must be understood as historically and culturally generated in a contingent manner, and 
this requires an approach that explores the subtle details, forms of behaviour, and manners 
of speech exhibited in everyday life. The abstract concepts of major paradigms such as 
Marxism, in which Willis works, must be translated by ethnographic enquiry into cultural 
terms and grounded in everyday life. 
The extent to which paradigms of development, social exclusion, and sustainable 
livelihoods are able to do this, needs rigorous analysis and critique. Through ethnographic 
enquiry, however, one gains an understanding of human subjects who exist buried as . 
abstractions in the language of systems analysis, economics, and climate change. Without 
ethnography, one can only imagine what is happening to real social actors caught up in 
complex macroprocesses. Ethnography is thus the "sensitive register of change" at the 
level of experience, and it is this kind of understanding that seems critical when the 
concepts of systems perspectives are descriptively out of joint with the reality to which 
they are meant to refer (Marcus and Fisher, 1986: 83). The ability of such methods as 
Rapid Rural Appraisal and livelihoods analyses, in themselves approximations of complex 
social realities, is thus called into question. 
Marcus and Fisher imagined a new kind of ethnography with which climate change 
adaptation researchers should be encouraged to engage. As ambitious as it sounds, it 
would mean leaving the language of regional planning in order to draw new connections 
between the micro-context of locale, with its particularisms and idiosyncrasies, and larger 
processes. This new text would take as its subject not only an isolated group of people or a 
region, affected in one way or another by climatic-political-economic forces, but the 
"system" itself - the political, economic and geographic processes, spanning different 
locales, or even different continents, but grounded in the personaL Ethnographically, these 
processes are registered in the activities of dispersed groups or individuals whose actions 
have mutual, often unintended, consequences for each other. This kind of experimental 
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ethnography would combine analytic techniques to grasp whole systems and the quality of 
lives caught up in them (ibid: 91). 
The question that presents itself for climate policy makers concerns the nature of the 
narratives and the politics of representation that inhere within the narrative. The art of 
representation being conducted within development and climate change debates needs to 
be examined. Discourses in the climate change debate are.still in the process of being 
shaped and formed. The immediate challenge is to be able to find a way to "accurately 
describe the penetration oflarger forces" into subjects' experiences and perspectives, and 
vice versa. In sum, an understanding of the mutual determination of political processes 
and economic activity in a historically viewed system of nation states needs to inform 
climate change research and policy. 
Climate change, culture and the nature of difference: from Geerlz to Harvey 
Clifford Geertz has had a significant impact on how culture is conceived. While Geertz . 
emphasized the way that culture structured meaning, the Foucauldian or Saidian 
perspective emphasizes the way in which culture structures power relationships. Ortner's 
(1999) discussion of this provides a useful starting point to examine the difficulties of 
understanding culture within the discourse of climate change (cf. Foucault, 1980; Said, 
1979). The concept of agency is integral to this discussion of culture. 
In using the livelihood framework adaptation research refers to the agency of actors 
affected by climate change. However, their use of the concept of agency needs to be 
explored. Ortner (1999) states that agency is both a question of meaning and power. In the 
context of questions of power, agency is that which is made or denied, expanded or 
contracted, in the exercise of power. It is the (sense of) authority to act, or oflack of 
authority and lack of empowerment. It is that dimension of power that is located in the 
actor's subjective sense of authorisation, control, effectiveness in the world. Within the 
framework of questions of meaning, on the other hand, agency represents the pressures of 
desires and understandings and intentions on cultural constructions. Much ofthe meaning 
uncovered in a cultural interpretation assumes, explicitly or implicitly, an actor engaged in 
a project, a game, a drama, an actor with not just a "point of view" but a more active 
projection of the self toward some desired end. In the first context, agency (or 
empowerment) is a both a source and an effect of power, in the second (more than just the 
"actor's point of view"), it is both a source and an effect of "culture". By weaving back 
and forth between Geertz and Foucault/Said, Ortner is able to show how the cultural 
construction of power is always, simultaneously, the cultural construction of forms of 
agency and effectiveness in dealing with powerful others (Ortner, 1999: 147). 
Geertz conceptualised culture as a text, which separated cultural products from their 
historical production and from the relations of power and domination in which they are 
necessarily enmeshed. Thus, suggests Roseberry, we should rather think of culture as a 
"material social process", as "production" rather than as a "product", constantly asking 
how, by whom, and for what ends it is being produced (Roseberry, 1989: 22). 
It is this kind of analysis that needs to underpin research into the adaptive capacity of both 
rural people in the 'south', governments and climate change scientists and international 
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technical advisors. There is always a circumscribed agency and set of sensibilities, desires, 
and so on, that constitute the cultural, in terms of both meaning and power. 
In enquiring into how a sense of justice is historically and geographically constituted, 
Harvey (1996) argues that spatial and ecological differences, of which climate change and 
its attendant politics are an expression, are not only constituted by, but constitutive of what 
he calls socio-ecological and political-economic processes. His argument forces one to 
realise that radically different socio-ecological processes imply quite different approaches 
to the question of what is or is not just (Harvey, 1996: 5). This presents a profound 
challenge for social scientists who recognise that the international politics of the climate 
change negotiations have an insidiously determining effect on the uniformity and stricture 
of methodologies and conceptual frameworks available to adaptation research. 
Harvey sides with literary theory arguing strongly against the large segment of social 
theory and the physical, biological and engineering sciences that sits comfortably and 
unquestioningly in the positivist paradigm. He argues that an understanding of dialectics 
can deepen our understanding of socio-ecological processes without entirely abandoning, 
findings arrived at by other means. In particular, he offers a dialectical way to emphasise 
relations and totalities, as opposed to isolated causal chains and fragmented hypotheses 
(ibid: 6). 
To warn against fetishizing the relational quality of the 'capitals' referred to in the 
livelihoods framework it is worth remembering that identities are fluid sites that can be 
understood differently depending on the vantage point of their formation and function 
(Friedman, 1995, in Harvey, 1996: 7). However, the reduction of everything to fluxes and 
flows has its limits. Harvey calls our attention to the "things, institutions, discourses and 
even states of mind of such relative permanence and power that it would be foolish not to 
acknowledge those evident qualities" (Harvey, 1996: 8). 
If one replaces the fixed idea of 'values' with an understanding of processes of valuation, 
we can better understand how and why certain kinds of permanence get constructed in 
particular places and times so as to form dominant social values to which most people 
willingly subscribe. It is important to understand the processes of valuation, of which 
money is a dominant symbol, that underpin the nascent field of climate change. The 
theoretical and methodological limitations imposed by the economic interests that 
underpin the climate change negotiations are an example of the processes of valuation to 
which Harvey refers. The process of money valuation, as Harvey points out, is 
simultaneously a process defining space, time, environment, and place (ibid: 11). The 
valuation of certain kinds of stories, from the mysteries of the atmosphere to the victims of 
climate, deserves careful attention. 
The politics of truth: from ideology to discourse, and back to the modern 
Marx's various definitions ofideology have a critical core. Whether he speaks of illusion 
and mystification, the critique of religion or the theory of commodity fetishism and other 
forms ofreification in capitalism, Marx's use of the idea is negative in that it conceives of 
ideology as some sort of distortion of thought. It is also an epistemological usage in that 
Marx proposes a distinction between knowledge or science on the one hand, and ideology 
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on the other: he makes claims about the inadequate knowledge status of ideology (Barrett, 
1991: 19). Foucault however, rejects the concept of ideology because (I) it is implicated, 
as the other side of the coin, in unacceptable truth claims, (2) it rests on a humanist 
individual subject, and (3) it is wrapped up in the unsatisfactory and determinist base-and-
superstructure model within Marxism. The alternative 'post-structuralist' critique of the 
theory of ideology uses the concept of 'discourse' as the focus of an alternative theoretical 
model. Foucault's elaboration ofthe concept of discourse goes beyond the common-sense 
definitions oftext, or spoken word, or language, to 'the rules that rules follow', which are 
taken for granted as an unconscious a priori (Said in Barrett, 1991: 126). 
It is with this awareness of the nature of ideologies and discourses that the possibility of a 
modernist discourse of ecological crisis and scientific certainty in the climate change arena 
is explored. I use these analytical tools not as truth daims~ but as a way of seeking an 
alternative language for adaptation research. 
In some readings the growth of ecology as a discipline reveals the end of modernity, the 
final breakdown of modem confidence, the settling up of accounts between exploited 
nature and an exploitative society. The rise of ecology seems to support the diagnosis of 
the postmodernists, notably Jean- Francois Lyotard, that modernity was a temporary phase 
of self-destructive overconfidence. There are many postmodern theories, but they share 
the view that modem culture was infected by a narrow rationalism, a naIve faith in 
progress and in Western techno-reason as the salvation of mankind. Myerson (2001) 
argues that ecology, to the contrary, is not postmodern at all. The ecological vision, of 
which climate change is an integral part, belongs to a moment of modernisation, another 
modem leap towards the future in which the grounds of modernity are re-established 
(Myerson, 2001: 6). 
Climate change research, then, fits neatly into the modernist project of ecology, which 
now claims to add a grasp of environmental consequences to the previous industrial 
system. In the year 2000, ecology provided plenty of new arguments for the legitimacy of 
modem order, and was the year of the' death of the postmodern', according to Myerson 
(ibid.) 
Modernism has always had a dissident side. Although ecology can be adapted to support 
the mainstream it is also the source of an alternative vision, which is not postmodern. 
Rather, it is a new wave of radical modernism, which can trace its lineage directly to the 
early twentieth century theories of nature and society. Myerson calls this radical ecology 
'the Ecopathology of Everyday Life'. According to Myerson, ecology is the science that 
presides over the new modernisation: it is a new story of progress that weaves a grand 
narrative around the new politics. The goal becomes not just a technologised world, but 
also an ecologised world. 
Freud's theory of Psychopathology ended the distinction between normal and pathological 
psychology in everyday life. He titled his most popular volume 'The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life to underline this challenge. By analogy, this new 'Ecopathology of 
Everyday Life' undermines the division between normal and pathological, from an 
ecological point of view. Freud saw little psychopathological symptoms everywhere in 
normal life. Ecopathology sees eco-symptoms breaking out everywhere in our mundane 
routines. It always emerges at a particular kind of moment: when expertise reads deep 
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significance into tiny and apparently insignificant details of our lives (Myerson, 2001: 51). 
Ecopathology, like Psychopathology, finds great significance where everyone else sees 
none at all. 
Thus, Myerson draws a close parallel between Freud's Psychopathology and 
contemporary Ecopathology. Behind the analogy lie the five main principles of Radical 
Modernism: (1) small is significant, (2) there is always a deeper explanation, (3) to 
understand means to connect, (4) the hidden meaning is always disturbing, and (5) the less 
direct the connection, the more significant it will be. While phrases like "out of control" 
abound, the language does not really challenge the legitimacy of the authorities or their 
experts: on the contrary, the greater the threat, such as global warming, the more 'we must 
do as we are told'. 
While proclaiming the death of postmodernism in this text, Myerson applies postmodern 
techniques from which we might beneficially borrow. While postmodemism mayor may 
not be dead, some of its techniques, such as discourse analysis, would useful to interrogate 
the discursive formations through which the science of climate change is constructed. 
Conclusion 
This paper explores the key issues around the social aspects of adaptation and climate 
change that deserve more rigorous attention. Whilst the difficulties that Chambers 
identifies in crossing between different professional discourses are acknowledged, many 
social science concepts, methods and approaches are being reapplied to adaptation 
research in new and sometimes awkward ways. 
In tracking the development of adaptation as a focus of research and policy in its own 
right, it is clear that the vocabulary of sociological ideas being used in this freshly formyd 
discourse is inadequate and unsophisticated. In exploring the limits of language and 
method provided by such theorists as Myerson (the end ofpostmodemism), Harvey (the 
relational and dialectical approach), Marcus and Fisher (scale and world political 
economy), as well as criticisms by d.u Toit and Murray of the livelihoods framework, I do 
not suggest that climate change is not real, nor that adaptation research should not be 
done. Rather, we should be exploring new ways of applying insights already critically 
theorised from a significant body of field experience produced in disciplines such as 
human geography, sociology, and anthropology. We need a new articulation of climate 
change theory and critical social theory that will encourage a more effective and realistic 
approach to adaptation research, policy, and practice. A critical reflexivity and awareness 
of the political economy of climate change adaptation, and of how adaptation research 
constructs agency for both researchers and their subjects, will serve to produce a stronger 
sense of trust in the research, as well as 'increase the realism of the analysis'. 
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